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Schlosser: Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers

ARTICLE

TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER
NONMEMBERS

Thomas P. Schlosser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the United States lacks a consensus concerning the
proper role of government power over individual persons and their
property. The issue of governmental jurisdiction is controversial at every
level of government; therefore, it is not surprising that the civil
jurisdiction of Indian tribal governments is also a controversial and
evolving topic.
The very existence of Indian tribes as recognized
governmental entities is also under constant challenge; afortioriso too is
the civil jurisdiction of tribal governments.
This paper begins with a general description of tribal civil
jurisdiction as recognized by the courts of the United States prior to
1978. Secondly, the paper traces the development of federal common
law of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers and suggests analysis of
cases in terms of four types of jurisdiction: (1) consensual relationships;
(2) threatening conduct; (3) congressionally delegated or recognized
authority; and (4) authority over Indian lands after discussing the
evolution of the inherent sovereignty doctrine in the Supreme Court and
recent appeals court cases, the paper focuses on congressionally
approved jurisdiction.
Rulings by the federal courts, particularly the United States
Supreme Court, on tribal authority over nonmembers have become
* Mr. Schlosser graduated from the University of Washington and from the University
of Virginia Law School. He is a director in the Seattle office of Morisset, Schlosser, Ayer &
Jozwiak, where he specializes in federal litigation, natural resource, and Indian tribal
property issues. Mr. Schlosser has litigated tribal cases concerning timber, water, energy,
fisheries, and federal breach of trust. He is also frequently involved in tribal economic
development and environmental regulation matters. Mr. Schlosser is an officer and
founding member of the Indian Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association.
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erratic and standardless. The Court's 1978 announcement that tribal
authority is withdrawn "by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status," represented an about-face on the theoretical
underpinnings of tribal sovereignty. 1 Subsequent analyses of "necessary
implication" and "dependent status" find little support in history,
anthropology, or logic. Rulings rejecting a particular tribe's effort to
exercise inherent tribal authority presume to set limits on all tribes'
inherent authority and quickly apply to different factual contexts. An
obvious movement away from acknowledging tribal territorial
jurisdiction and inherent sovereignty continues to appear in recent cases
that address the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
II.

CIVIL JURISDICTION BEFORE 1978

In the first 200 years of the United States of America the course of
judicial decisions on the nature of Indian tribal powers was marked by
adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) an Indian tribe possesses,
in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state; (2) conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States,
terminating the external power of the tribe but not affecting the internal
sovereignty of the tribe; and (3) except where expressly qualified, full
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in Indian tribes and their duly
constituted organs of government. 2
From the earliest days of the republic, Indian tribes were recognized
as "distinct, independent, political communities."3
Indian tribes
qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by virtue of any
delegation of powers from the federal government but by reason of their
original tribal sovereignty. Tribes' sovereignty predated the Constitution
of the United States, and is acknowledged in the Commerce Clause's
grouping of the "Indian Tribes" with "foreign Nations" and "the several
States."4 Thus treaties and statutes were looked to by the courts as
limitations upon original tribal powers or, in some cases, recognition of
particular powers. Lower courts applied the general principle that "it is
only by positive enactments, even in the case of conquered and subdued
nations, that their laws are changed by the conqueror." s In Worcester,
Chief Justice Marshall adopted principles of European law holding that
weak States, in order to provide for their safety, may place themselves
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping themselves

1. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
2. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 230-35 (Mitchie Bobbs-Merrill
1982).
3. Worcesterv. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845) (upholding tribal divorce).
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of the right of government and ceasing to be States.6
During the mid-nineteenth century, the gradual establishment of
permanent reservations for most surviving Indian tribes produced a body
of law concerning the civil jurisdiction of tribal governments over
nonmembers. This law is illustrated in decisions concerning taxing
power.
In Maxey v. Wright,7 the right of a tribe to levy a tax upon
nonmembers of the tribe, attorneys practicing in federal court and
residing on the reservation, was held to be an essential attribute of tribal
sovereignty.8 The Court said:
[Iun the absence of express contradictory provisions by treaty, or by
statutes of the United States, the nation and not a citizen is to declare who
shall come within the boundaries of its occupancy, and under what...
conditions. 9

Within the Chickasaw Nation, later becoming part of the State of
Oklahoma, arose the case of Morris v. Hitchcock.10 In this case, the
Interior Department sought to remove livestock pastured within the
reservation without a tribal permit or license and to close businesses
conducted without permits. Two years prior to this, Congress protected
the rights of resident nonmembers by prohibiting the Interior
Department from removing them. However, Congress also provided in
the Curtis Act, that tribal law would apply upon executive approval:
[N]o act.., of... the Choctaw or Chickasaw tribes.., shall be of any
validity until approved by the President of the United States.... Said
acts.., when 11so approved, shall be published in at least two
newspapers ....
The Court concluded that the Curtis Act was intended "to permit
the continued exercise, by the legislative body of the tribe, of such a
power as is here complained of, subject to a veto power in the President
over such legislation as a preventive of arbitrary and injudicious
action." 12 The Court thus upheld the permit tax on livestock within the
Chickasaw Reservation whether or not the livestock owners lawfully
possessed parcels of land in towns and cities in the Reservation.
In addition, a few years prior to the Morris case, the United States
Attorney General had issued a similar opinion, with respect to the right
of the Cherokee Nation to impose an export tax on hay grown within the
6. Worcester,31 U.S. at 559.
7. 54 S.W. 807 (Ind.Terr. CL App. 1900), affd, 105 Fed. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900).
8. Id.
9. I& at 809.
10. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
11. The Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495, 512 (1898).
12. Morris, 194 U.S at 393. This case is given as an example of consensual jurisdiction
(Montana "exception one"), but it can also be seen as an example of congressional
authorization. See Mont v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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limits of the reservation.13
The opinion of the Attorney General
suggested that tribal authority to impose such a tax would remain "even
if the shipper was the absolute owner of the land on which the hay was
raised." 14 This suggestion
was referred to and approved by the Supreme
5
Court in Morris.1
The Creek Nation was also successful in the similar case, Buster v.
Wright.16 In that case, non-tribal members contended that the sale of
lots to them and the incorporation of cities and towns within Creek
territory, as authorized by Congress, segregated the town sites and lots
from the territory of the Creek Nation and deprived the Creeks of
governmental jurisdiction to impose a permit tax on the privilege of
trading within the Creek Nation. The Court said:
But the jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not
conditioned or limited by the title of the land which they occupy in it, or by
the existence of municipalities therein endowed with power to collect taxes
for city purposes, and to enact and enforce municipal ordinances. Neither
the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the power to
govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities
therein endowed with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the
ownership nor occupancy7 of the land within its territorial jurisdiction by
its citizens or foreigners.'
In 1934, Congress authorized tribes to exercise additional
authorities beyond the "powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law."18 This Congressional act, called the Indian
Reorganization Act ("IRA"), led to Nathan Margold, Interior Department
Solicitor, issuing an opinion on what powers were vested in tribes and
tribal councils by then existing law. Margold's seminal opinion, 19 notes
that the powers of Indian tribes can only be answered generally because
individual tribes' authority is affected by special treaties and acts of
Congress. Margold found that:
[O]ver all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by
members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of
determining the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to

13. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528, 530 (1900); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174, 177-78 (1855).
14. Id.
15. Morris, 194 U.S. at 392.
16. 135 F. 947 (1905).
17. Id. at 951. In a case discussed infra, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645 (2001), the Court rejected Buster's statement that an Indian tribe's jurisdiction to
govem the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the title to the land
that they occupy in it. The Atkinson Court claimed it had never endorsed that statement in
Buster, although the majority plainly did so in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 141-43 (1982), and both the Court and commentators have consistently cited Buster
with approval.
18. 25 U.S.C.A. § 476(e) (West 2001).
19. 1 Op. Sol. Int. 445 (1934).
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enter its domain, to reside therein, and to do business.20
While much of Margold's opinion addresses the authority of tribes over
their own members, its discussion of taxes, licensing, and the power to
exclude remains important to analysis of tribal 'civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers. 2 1
The case of Williams v. Lee,2 2 also made clear that tribes retained
jurisdiction over nonmembers.
This case remains a Twentieth Century
landmark ruling on tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. In the
case, an action by a non-Indian against reservation Indians was held to
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo tribal courts.24 The
Court noted that the transaction occurred on the reservation and said:
'The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of

Indian governments over their reservations." 25

In cases during the early Twentieth Century, through Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,26 the Supreme Court generally adhered to an
analytical approach that required a clear and specific expression of
congressional intent to extinguish tribal authorities and immunities.2 7
Nevertheless, in retrospect, cracks were starting to appear in the rule
that tribal civil authority exists except where affirmatively limited by a
specific treaty provision or statute.
III.

JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS, 1978-2000

In 1973, the Court signaled its departure from the doctrine that
reserved tribal authority stemming from inherent sovereignty was
plenary, alterable only by express statute or treaty provision. In
McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Commission,28 the Supreme Court ruled

that Arizona had no jurisdiction to impose a tax on the income of Navajo
families residing on the reservation whose income was wholly derived
from reservation sources.2 9
The Court noted that the principles
governing the resolution of the tax question were "not new," and cited
Worcester and other cases for the proposition that tribes are distinct
political communities having territorial boundaries within which their
authority is exclusive.3 0 However Justice Marshall warned that inherent
20. Id. at 101.
21. Id.;Cohen, supran.2.
22. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 223.
26. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
27. Id.; see Menominee Tribe v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that treaty rights not
specifically extinguished continue to exist); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(holding that Public Law 280 is read narrowly to preserve tribal authority).
28. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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tribal sovereignty had been diminished:
This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, with its
concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law, has remained
static during the 141 years since Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly,
the doctrine has undergone considerable evolution in response to changed
circumstances ....
This line of cases was summarized in this Court's landmark decision in
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959): 'Over the years this Court has
modified (the Worcester principle) in cases where essential tribal relations
were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized ....

'1

The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes
which define the limits of state power.. . The Indian sovereignty doctrine
is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the
issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read... [Indian nations
Indian tribes] 'were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserve their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
intemal and social relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws of
32
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.'
The clouds in the McClanahanvictory foreshadowed a sea of change in
federal common law of tribal jurisdiction in 1978.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,33 the Supreme Court stated:
"[An examination of our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even
ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, Indians do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of
such power by Congress.
In addition, the Court declared that tribes
retain elements of "quasi-sovereign" authority, but the retained powers
are limited by more than the specific restrictions in treaties and
congressional enactments,3 5
"Indian tribes are prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers inconsistent with their
status." 36 In the years since Oliphant the federal courts have embarked
31. I& at219-20.
32. Id. at 171-73 (citations omitted).
33. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
34. Id. at 208.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Burger dissented on
the ground that the power to preserve order on the reservation is a sine qua non of the
sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed and that, absent affirmative
withdrawal by treaty or statute, tribes retain the power to punish all offenders. That view
lost, and those Justices are gone.
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on a wide-ranging search for powers believed to be "inconsistent with the
tribes' dependent status. "37 Many such limitations have been found.
In Oliphant, the Suquaniish Tribe claimed authority to try
non-Indians not on the basis of a "congressional statute or treaty
provision but by reason of [its] retained national sovereignty."38 This
case involved defendants charged with assaulting a police officer and
resisting arrest or with recklessly endangering another person as a
result of a high-speed chase and collision with a tribal police vehicle.
The Court noted that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians by tribal courts was a relatively new phenomenon. 39 Even
though some tribes had formal criminal systems during the
Nineteenth Century, the Oliphant Court stated that treaties with the
tribes assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians "absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that
effect." 40 In the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Court found indications that
the Suquamish and other tribes would not have criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.4 1 Specifically, the Washington Treaty Commission
prepared a draft treaty under which white offenders would be tried by
the laws of the United States. However, that language was not used in
the final treaty. Instead the Suquamish and other tribes "acknowledged
their dependence on the government of the United States."42 The Tribe
contended that the Treaty Commission chose the treaty language
because of tribal opposition to relinquishing criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, but the Court rejected evidence to support that view.43
The Court also noted another treaty provision in which the tribe
agreed "not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United
States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for trial."44 The Court
concluded that by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, treaty tribes necessarily gave up their power to try non-Indian
citizens of the United States "except in a manner acceptable to
Congress."45 The Court found that modem tribal courts resemble their
state counterparts and that the applicability of the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 and the prevalence of non-Indian crime on reservations "are
considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes
should finally be authorized to try non-Indians."46

37. Id.

38. Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Oliphant,434 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208 n. 16.
Id.
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
Id. at211-12.
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The stunning decision in Oliphant immediately led to arguments
that tribes lacked civil jurisdiction as well as criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers within their reservations.
Initially, the United States
Supreme Court refused to embrace that approach. However, the Court's
new analysis based on implicit divestiture of tribal authority was
reiterated just two weeks after Oliphant in United States v. Wheeler.47
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,48
rejected the State of Washington's contention that inherent tribal
authority to tax the activities or property of non-Indians is inconsistent
with the overriding interests of the national government. 49 The Court
said:
[A]uthority to tax the activities or property of non-Indians taking place or
situated on Indian lands, in cases where the tribe has a significant interest
in the subject matter, was very probably one of the tribal powers under
'existing law' confirmed by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. § 476.50
The Colville court acknowledged the implicit divestiture analysis of
Oliphant and Wheeler, but noted that such divestiture had only been
found when tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their
lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians
in tribal courts. 51 Also, while the Court found that the IRA "confirmed"
the tribal power to tax events on Indian land, 52 it did not find that
Congress had also preempted state taxing power over nonmember
transactions. Thus, in Colville, the Court upheld the tribe's authority to
impose cigarette taxes on nonmember purchasers on reservations on the
basis of inherent authority and the IRA's ratification of that authority,
and it also upheld the state's authority to tax the same transactions.5 3
Colville illustrates that the analysis of statutes concerning tribal
authority is a two-step process. In Colville, the Court first examined
statutes fostering tribal self-government and found that they confirmed
tribal power to act. Second, the Court found none of the statutes
intended to give tribal enterprises a competitive advantage over all other
businesses, nor to comprehensively regulate all sales by Indians to
nonmembers of the tribe.54 The Court noted that Congress could create
that power:

47. 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that double jeopardy does not exist in federal and tribal
prosecution of the same offense by a tribal member).
48. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
49. Id.

50. Id. at 153.
51. Id.

52. Nathan Margold, Powers of IndianTribes, I Ops. Sol. Int. 445, 447 (1934) (citing the
IRA as a "general confirmation of powers already recognized").
53. Id.
54. Id.
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[AlIthough the Tribes themselves could perhaps pre-empt state taxation
through the exercise of properly delegated federal power to do so, cf. Fisher
v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam; United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), we do not infer from the mere fact of federal
approval of the Indian taxing ordinances, or from the fact that the Tribes
exercise congressionally sanctioned powers of self-government, that
Congress has delegated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state
sales 5and
cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of the
5
Tribe.
In contrast, the lower court in Colville believed that the tribal tax
preempted the state tax. It reasoned that because Congress can validly
delegate legislative authority to a tribe, when a tribe exercises such
delegated authority and the result is a tribal ordinance that conflicts
with an otherwise valid state statute, the state statute is preempted.
The lower court relied upon Fisherv. District CourL9 6 In Fisher,an 1877
statute provided that Congress would "secure" to the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe "an orderly government."57 As authorized later by the IRA, the
Tribe adopted a Constitution and established a tribal court with
jurisdiction over adoptions. Fisher,however, involved enactments that
affected only Indians and did not authorize preemption of state law
through ordinances affecting non-Indians.5 8
The first major restriction of tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers came in 1981 with the decision in Montana v. United
States.59 In Montana, non-Indian fee landowners challenged the power
of the Crow Tribe to restrict their hunting and fishing on and near the
Big Horn River. 60 The tribe sought to rely on its ownership of the bed of
the Big Horn River. In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court held
that the riverbed passed to the State upon its admission into the Union
and that the authority of the Crow Tribe recognized in the Fort Laramie
Treaty to control hunting and fishing could only extend to land on which
the tribe exercised absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.6 In
general, Montana establishes that tribes lack plenary regulatory
authority over activities of nonmembers on lands alienated to
non-Indians as a result of the General Allotment Act. 62 The Court
applied the implicit divestiture of sovereignty notion from Oliphant and
established as a "general proposition" that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Washington, 447 U.S. at 156.
424 U.S. 382 (1976).
19 Stat. 256 (1877).
Fisher,424 U.S. at 382.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).

Id.
Id.

Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 7
582

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:573

63
tribe, subject to several exceptions.

Montana, establishes a three-tiered test to determine if tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers exists. One of the following three tests
must be met: (1) "express congressional delegation," (2) "taxation,
licensing, or other means [regulating] the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements," or (3)
"conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [the] reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."6
By 1989, Montana began to be viewed as the Rehnquist Court's
seminal opinion on tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
In
particular, two of the exceptions to Montana's general rule: the
consensual relationship exception and the threatening conduct
exception, have come to be known as Montana Exceptions One and Two.
It is important to recognize that reliance on these exceptions
oversimplifies both the Montana decision itself and current federal
common law on tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
Initially, it is critical to recall that Montana addressed tribal
regulation of nonmembers on lands alienated to non-Indians, so neither
its general rule nor its exceptions apply to activities on tribal land. In
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,65 the Court upheld a tribal severance
tax on oil and gas production on tribal reservation land, concluding that
the taxing power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty that has
not been divested by any treaty or act of Congress. 66 In a six-to-three
decision the Court found the tribe's taxing power within its general
authority, as a sovereign, to control economic activities within its
jurisdiction and to defray the cost of providing governmental services. 67
The Court majority and minority divided over the question whether
the tribe's power to tax was derived solely from its power to exclude
non-Indians from the reservation.6 8 Petitioners operated under approved
long-term leases with the tribe. The Court held that although the tribe
had agreed to sell the right to use the land, it had not abandoned its
sovereign powers simply by failing to expressly reserve them in a
contract.6 9 The majority did not rely upon consensual jurisdiction and
did not cite Montana. Instead the Court relied upon Colville.7 0 The

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 564-66.
Id. at 566.
455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Id.
Id.
I.
Id.
Colville, 447 U.S. 134.
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72
71
majority also refused to recharacterize Buster, and Maxey v. Wright,
discussed herein, as having relied upon the power to exclude. The Court
stated:

Instead, these cases demonstrate that a tribe has the power to tax
nonmembers only to the extent the nonmember enjoys the privilege of
trade or other activity on the reservation to which the tribe can attach a
tax. This limitation on tribal taxing authority exists not because the tribe
has the power to exclude nonmembers, but because the limited authority
that a tribe may exercise over nonmembers does not arise until the
nonmember enters the tribal jurisdiction. We do not question that there is
a significant territorial component to tribal power: a tribe has no authority
over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts
business with the tribe.73
In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,7 4 the Court also upheld the Navajo
Nation's authority to impose a possessory interest tax on lands leased to
a nonmember mining company doing business on the reservation,
although the Nation's ordinance was not approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. 8
Iowa MutuaL Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,6 broadly upheld tribal
adjudicatory authority.
LaPlante involved an accident in which a
member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe was injured while driving a cattle
truck within the boundaries of the reservation. 7 The injured member
was employed by a Montana corporation that operated a ranch on
reservation land owned by tribal members, and sued in tribal court. The
insurer commenced a federal court action asserting diversity
jurisdiction, a case that was later dismissed. The Supreme Court held
that the case should have been stayed pending exhaustion of tribal court
remedies and said:
Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is
an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such
activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited
by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.... In the absence of any
indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the
jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner's invitation to hold
that tribal sovereignty can be impaired in this fashion. 8
With the benefit of hindsight we know that the Court's reference to tribal

71. Buster, 135 F. 947.
72. 54 S.W. 807 (Ind. Terr. Ct. App. 1900), affd, 105 Fed. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900).
73. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141-42.
74. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
75. Id.
76. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 18 (citing Mont, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (1981); Colvitle, 447 U.S. at 152-53;
Fisher,424 U.S. 382, 387-89).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 7
584

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:573

courts "presumptively" having jurisdiction was overbroad and that the
requirement that the insurer exhaust tribal court remedies may no
longer apply, at least in the Ninth Circuit.7 9 However, in historical
context, the 1987 decision in Iowa Mutual fit comfortably within an
analysis based on Martinez, Colville, Montana, and MerrionrY0
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation,8 1 upheld a tribal zoning ordinance over some reservation fee
lands, but not others.82 Most of the fee land on the Yakama Reservation,
including Wilkinson's property, is found in three towns. The rest,
including Brendale's land, is scattered throughout the reservation in a
checkerboard pattern. 83 The district court held that the tribe had
exclusive jurisdiction over the property of Brendale, a nonmember, but
lacked authority over the Wilkinson property under Montana
Exception Two.84 The Ninth Circuit Court upheld tribal zoning authority
throughout the reservation, reasoning that denying the tribe local
governmental police power to zone fee land would destroy its capacity to
engage in comprehensive planning.8 5
In a fractured decision, split 4-2-3, the United States Supreme
Court upheld tribal jurisdiction to zone areas where the amount of
nonmember owned land was small enough that the tribe retained the
power to define the area's essential Indian character.8 6 The Court
rejected tribal authority to zone the Wilkinson property, which was
located in an area of the reservation that contained a large proportion of
fee land owned by nonmembers.87 The conflicting opinions of the Court
make it difficult to determine whether tribal authority over the land and
person of nonmembers is an application of Montana Exception Two,
Exception One, or a special category of its own.
The plurality opinion of Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy disposed of the Yakama Nation's critique of language in
Montana, which rejected Crow tribal regulation of hunting and fishing on
fee lands owned by non-Indians in the absence of an express
congressional delegation. 8
The Yakama Nation contended that
insistence on a congressional delegation to assert jurisdiction conflicted
with Colville.8 9 The Court distinguished Colville noting that it involved

79. See Wilson v. Marchington,127 F. 3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. See Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Mont., 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Men-ion, 455 U.S. at
141-42.
81. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 414.
84. Id. at 420-21.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 432-33.
87. Brendale,492 U.S. at 432-33.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 426-27.
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transactions on trust land and significantly involved tribal members. 90
Montana cited ColvtUe as an example of the sort of "consensual
relationship" that might support tribal authority over nonmembers on
fee lands. 9'
Efforts to avoid the Montana general rule failed in 1990. South
Dakota v. Bourand,92 involved a tribal assertion of jurisdiction over
nonmember hunting and fishing activities on lands that were taken from
tribal ownership pursuant to statute for reservoir purposes. 93 Bourland
contains additional dicta regarding the limited authority of tribes over
as a case in which
nonmembers on fee lands, but is best understood
94
Congress expressly limited tribal authority.
9 5 further muddled tribal civil jurisdiction
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
over nonmembers and illustrates the callous fashion in which the Court
occasionally treats Indian tribal governments. 96 In Strate, the Supreme
Court held that a tribal court could not entertain jurisdiction over a
personal injury claim involving two non-Indians. The case arose from an
auto accident on a right-of-way through the Fort Berthold Reservation
acquired and maintained by the State of North Dakota as a public
highway. According to Justice Ginsberg, writing for a unanimous court,
Strate involved a claim "distinctly non-tribal in nature... between two
non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill [highway accident]."9 7
In Strate, the Court determined that the right-of-way granted for a
public highway was the equivalent of the non-Indian fee land in
Montana, based upon several factors, including: (1) the legislation
creating the right-of-way; (2) whether the right-of-way was acquired with
the consent of the Tribe; (3) whether the Tribe had reserved the right to
exercise dominion and control over the right-of-way; (4) whether the land
was open to the public; and (5) whether the right-of-way was under state
These factors suggest that caution must be used in
control. 98
considering the effect of Strate in other situations. The Strate Court also
emphasized that the cases cited in Montana in support of the first and
second exceptions, indicate the character of the tribal interests the

90. Id.
91. Id. at 427 (citing Mont, 450 U.S. at 565-66).
92. 508 U.S. 679 (1990).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 520 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1997).
96. Id. "Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a
reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members.
But if Montana's second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink
the rule. Again, cases cited in Montana indicate the character of the tribal interest the
Court envisioned." Id. at 459.
97. Id. at 457.
98. Id. at 454-56; see Mont Dept of Trans. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108, 1113 n. 1 (9th Cir.
1999) (listing criteria applied in Strate).
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Court intended to protect. 99
Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. v. Shirley, 00 rejected the Navajo
Nation's claim that inherent sovereignty supported imposition of a hotel
occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its
reservation.'0 °
The Court analyzed the first and second Montana
exceptions and held them inapplicable.
The Court rejected broad
language in Merrion and earlier cases and found the analysis of Brendale
to be inapplicable because the effects of the trading post did not
endanger the Navajo Nation's political integrity.1°
The Tenth Circuit upheld the tribal tax, finding that because a
consensual relationship existed between Nation and guests the Nation
had inherent jurisdiction to tax. 10 3 On petitions for rehearing, the Court
of Appeals split evenly so rehearing was denied.
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion reversing the appellate
court did not comment on the standards for reviewing tribal court
decisions, but rejected the Tenth Circuit's finding of consensual
relationships between the Navajo Nation and the hotel guests or the
trading post.10 4 The Court stressed that the case did not involve a claim
of statutorily conferred power. 0 5 In addition, the court noted that
neither the Indian Trader's Statute, 1o' nor the regulations adopted under
that statute, authorized the hotel occupancy tax at issue.
In the last week of its 2000 Term, the Court seemed to contract
tribal authority more. But, on analysis, this was a special situation.
State of Nevada v. Hicks,107 involved an action by a tribal member
against state officials arising from tort and civil rights violations while
executing a search warrant on Indian-owned land.'0 8
Judge Betty
Fletcher, for a divided appellate panel, upheld tribal court jurisdiction.
Carefully analyzing Strate, the Ninth Circuit found that the Supreme
Court had expressed "no view on the governing law or proper forum
when an accident occurs on tribal land" within a reservation. ° 9 The
Strate court emphasized that the decision in Montana related to
"reservation land acquired in fee simple by non-Indian owners. " 1 °
Judge Fletcher explained that the Ninth Circuit's post-Strate opinions
"are consistent with evolving Supreme Court precedent that stresses

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 457-58.
532 U.S. 645 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Atkinson Tading, 532 U.S 645.
Id.
25 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2001).
121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
Id.
Nev. v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 442).
Strate, 520 U.S. at 446.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss2/7

14

Schlosser: Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
2001]

TRIBAL CMWL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS

587

membership and rights of land ownership as sources of tribal power. " "'
In the opinion, she reasoned:
Unlike Montana, Strate, Wilson, County of Lewis, and King, the incidents
underlying the instant case occurred on Indian-owned, Indian-controlled
land, over which the tribe retained its right to exclude non-members. In
the absence of federal statutes limiting it, the Tribe has exclusive criminal
jurisdiction in Indian [C]ountry over minor crimes committed by Indians.
Unlike the Agreement in County of Lewis, the warrant in this case bestows
no broad grant of authority upon the State of Nevada. The [tiribe retained
sovereignty over the land upon which the search and seizure took place.
The land on which Hicks' residence stood was neither open to the public,
nor controlled or maintained by any entity other than the tribe ....
We find that the Montana presumption against tribal court jurisdiction
does not apply in this case. Instead, in line with Strate and County of
Lewis, we look to the tribe's power to exclude state officers from the land
at issue. The [tiribe's unfettered power to exclude state officers from its
land implies its authority to regulate the behavior of non-members on that

land. 112
The Supreme Court reversed and fied five opinions in Hicks." 3 All
Justices agreed that the Ninth Circuit erred. Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court began with the facile equation from Strate, that tribal4
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed tribal legislative jurisdiction."
He then noted that tribes don't necessarily have regulatory authority
over nonmembers on tribal land because Oliphant didn't rely on land
status." 5 Land ownership is only one factor to consider. Brendale,
according to Scalia, is the only case in which the Court has approved
116
tribal authority over a nonconsenting nonmember's fee land.
In addition, Justice Scalia reasoned that states have authority over
crimes committed off reservation and deduced that tribal authority over
officers asserting state investigative power is not necessary for self
He decided that exhaustion was unnecessary by
government. " 7
admittedly broadening the exception that exhaustion is not required
where it would serve no purpose other than delay.
Justice Souter writing for himself, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Thomas, stated the Court was right but they could reach the same result
more directly by simply extending Montana to tribal land.1 8 Thus, for

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Hicks, 196 F.3d at 1026.
I& at 1027-28.
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304.
Id. at 2309.
Id. at2309-10.

Id.
Id. at2311-12.
1&. at2318-24.
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the justices, the main rule for nonmember fee land would be the main
rule for all land, and the inquiry into whether rights of way can be
aligned with fee land, as Strate did, was arguably pointless.' 1 9
Justice Ginsburg filed a separate one-page opinion to emphasize
that the Court was only deciding the question of tribal court jurisdiction
over state officers enforcing state law. Justice Stevens (with Justice
Breyer) joined the Court's opinion only to reject the idea that tribal
courts cannot enforce claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 12 Stevens points
out that the majority had it backwards, in looking for a statute that
authorizes tribal courts to hear such claims, when the real question was
whether Congress has said tribal courts shouldn't hear such claims. It
may be that a majority of the Court has changed the presumption drawn
2
from Congressional silence about a tribal court.' 1
Finally, Justice O'Connor (with Stevens and Breyer) agreed with the
Court, but declared "Part II of the Court's opinion is unmoored from our
precedents., 12 2 Justice O'Connor joined Justice Scalia in declaring that
Montana's main rule and exceptions governs all reservation lands.
However, she was concerned that the Court had given too little emphasis
to tribal land status as a factor to consider in applying the Montana
Justice O'Connor evidently believed a consensual
exceptions. 12 3
relationship may exist for purposes of the Montana first exception1 24
However, the Ninth 5 Circuit erred in refusing to address the officers'
immunity defenses.12
Justice O'Connor also noted that some state-tribal agreements can
confer tribal court authority even if the process of getting a search
warrant didn't do so in this case. 12
Her opinion, as well as Justice
Scalia's opinion, emphasizes that the tribe's authority here is not
founded on a Congressional authorization or delegation of power, citing
several examples of Congressionally approved authority.
IV.

POST-STRATE APPELLATE DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE MONTANA
EXCEPTIONS

Even before Atkinson and Hicks, the Court's unanimous decision in
Strate and its emphasis upon a narrow construction of the two Montana
exceptions, produced a series of appellate decisions that tended to
narrow tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. In summary form,
here are a number of those decisions.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2318-24.
Id. at 2324.
Id.
Id. at 2324-34.
Id.
Id.
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2324-34.
Id.
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In Yellowstone County v. Pease,17 a member of the Crow Tribe sued
in tribal court to enjoin Yellowstone County from imposing state property
taxes on his land located within the reservation. 128 The tribal court
concluded that Montana's constitution bars the County from imposing
taxes on Pease's land. 2 9 The federal district court rejected tribal
jurisdiction under both the first Montana exception and the second
Montana exception. 130 The Crow Allotment Act of 1920 does not give rise
to a consensual agreement that enables the tribe to qualify for
jurisdiction under the first Montana exception. Possible foreclosure on
Pease's property does not establish a direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe
within the meaning of South Dakota v. Bourlandand Montana.131
In Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management
District, 32 the tribe brought a declaratory judgment action to enforce its
claimed right to approve and regulate a landfill site over which the State
claimed jurisdiction on the basis that an 1894 statute disestablished or
diminished the Yankton Reservation. 1 3 The district court ruled that the
Yankton Reservation was not disestablished but that the tribe did not
have regulatory authority over the project.'34 The court held that the
tribe had not shown a right to regulate the landfill site since it had not
established the applicability of either Montana exception. 35
Strate
shows that only matters affecting tribal self-government and consensual
13 6
relations with the tribe are excepted from the general Montana rule.
In Wilson v. Marchington,137 a Blackfeet tribal member brought suit
in tribal court and obtained a money judgment for tort damages arising
from a traffic accident with a non-Indian on U.S. Highway 2 within the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation.' 38 The tribal member then brought suit in
United States district court to register the tribal court judgment against
the non-Indian driver. Congress did not extend full faith and credit to
all judgments of tribes under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 so recognition of tribal
judgment must rest on the principles of comity13 9 Here the tribal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, a determination "commanded by

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996).
1&
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
926 F. Supp. 888 (D.S.D. 1998), rev'd on othergrounds, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 891.
Id.
127 F. 3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 807-08.
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Strate." 14 0 The requirement of bringing individual tort claims in state or
federal court does not have a demonstrably serious effect or imperil the
political integrity, the economic security or the health and 142
welfare of the
tribe. 14 1 Hinshaw v. Mahler, has been effectively overruled.

Montana v. Gilhar, 143 posed the question whether the State of
Montana may be subjected to an unconsented tort action filed by an
individual plaintiff in Blackfeet Tribal Court; held, Montana's sovereign
immunity bars such an action. 144 Gilham was fatally injured when her
car struck a highway sign at the intersection of U.S. Highways 2 and 89
within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.145 Montana
unsuccessfully appealed the immunity issue to the Blackfeet Court of
Appeals and the Blackfeet Supreme Court, then fied an action for
declaratory relief in U.S. district court. Because states have retained
their historical sovereign immunity from suits by individuals, the
46
inherent retained power of tribes does not abrogate that immunity.
Montana's waiver of immunity is limited to its own courts.
In Hornell Brewing Company v. Seth Big Crow,147 the estate of Crazy
Horse brought an action in tribal court asserting defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress because of breweries' use of
the Crazy Horse name in an alcoholic beverage. 148 In 1996, the Rosebud
Sioux Supreme Court held that the breweries had sufficient contacts
with the Reservation to uphold service of process and that the estate had
established prima facie subject matter jurisdiction.1 49 The United States
district court enjoined the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court from conducting
further proceedings on the merits but directed an evidentiary hearing on
the issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.15 0 The Eighth
Circuit held that neither Montana nor subsequent cases allow tribes to
exercise civil jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians occurring
outside their reservations.' 5 1 The court emphasized footnote fourteen in
Strate, declaring that exhaustion is not applicable where it is plain that
no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers'
conduct. 152

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
IdL
Ic at 815.
133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1997).
I&
Id.
Id.
133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1093-94.
Id. at 1092-93.
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In Enlow v. Moore,153 owners of restricted allotments fied a quiet
title action in Muskogee Creek Nation Tribal Court against Enlow, a
non-Indian property owner.6 4 Enlow filed his own quiet title action in
state court, and also sued in federal court seeking an injunction
prohibiting the tribal court from assuming jurisdiction in the case. 55
The tribal court held that it had jurisdiction. 5 6 Where no treaty
provision or federal statute divests the tribal court of jurisdiction, it may
properly exercise jurisdiction over a civil dispute involving a non-Indian
and Indian land. On remand the federal district court must determine
whether the tribal supreme court's finding that the disputed property
lies within Indian country is clearly erroneous. 157
In Montana v. U.S. EPA, 158 Montana attacked EPA's decision to
grant treatment as state status for water quality standards purposes to
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian
Reservation. 59 The EPA regulations require the tribe to show that the
regulated activities affect the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe and that the potential effects be serious
and substantial. The Court upheld EPA, holding that EPA's decision to
adopt inherent tribal authority
as the standard intended by Congress is
0
entitled to deference. 16
In County of Lewis v. Allen, 16 ' a tribal member sued in tribal court
for false arrest, stemming from an arrest for disturbing the peace. 62
In 1965, a Nez Perce tribal resolution consented to have Idaho "assume
and exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction over offenses" other than
major crimes.'6
The Ninth Circuit determined that the consent to
criminal jurisdiction was tantamount to alienation of the land to
non-Indians for the limited purpose of criminal law enforcement. 6 4
Montana Exception One does not apply to an intergovernmental law
enforcement agreement.165 Having divested itself of sovereignty over the
activities that gave rise to the civil claim, this case does not threaten
self-government or the political integrity, economic security or health

153. 134 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 1998).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 994.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 996-97; see Mustang Production Co. v. Harrison,94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir.

1996) (holding that district court reviews tribal court findings of fact for clear error and
conclusions of law de novo).
158. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
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166
and welfare of the tribe.
Johnson v. Gila River Indian Community,167 held that a litigant need
not exhaust his appellate remedies in tribal court where the tribal
appellate court has not responded to initial pleadings for an extended
period of time.16 8
The tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction
because the claims arose out of a commercial relationship with the tribe
69
on its reservation. 1
In 7IEA Corp. v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo,'7° T'EA managed a
smokeshop on the Pueblo's reservation in El Paso.171 The management
agreement had never been approved under 25 U.S.C. § 81.172 The tribe
sued in tribal court seeking a declaration that the agreement was void.
Without holding a hearing, the court determined that it had jurisdiction
and that the agreement was void. The federal district court dismissed
for failure to exhaust. Because the tribal trial judge denied TI EA's
appeal and no further remedies were available, no federal abstention was
required. 173 Although the district court had not examined the tribal
court's jurisdiction under the Restoration Act, the Fifth Circuit did so
and upheld the Pueblo's jurisdiction. 174
State of Montana Department of Transportation.V. King,175 held that
Fort Belknap Tribal Employment Rights Office ordinance is not
enforceable against employees of the state performing road work on a
right-of-way across the reservation. 76
When tribes assumed their
present dependent status they did not possess the authority to regulate
177
or sue the states. Montana Exception two must be narrowly applied.

In Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Red Wolf'178 two
members were killed when a train collided with their car while the train
was traveling along a right-of-way within the Crow Reservation. 179 The
court rejected tribal court civil jurisdiction over the members' estates'
tort claims. 80 Under the Strate analysis, a federally created right-of-way
is the functional equivalent of land alienated in fee to nonmembers.
Accordingly, Montana's main rule applies to an accident on a right-of-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
174 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685.
191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
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way granted by Congress to the Railroad's predecessor in interest. 8 '
Under the first exception, a right-of-way created by congressional grant
is a transfer of a property interest that does not create a continuing
consensual relationship between a tribe and the grantee. 8 2 Under Strate
and Marchington, the injury of a tribal member does not satisfy Montana
Exception Two. l8 3
The Red Wolf court tried to harmonize its results with Merrion and
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Blackfeet Tribe,184 concluding
that the tribe's taxing power is greater than its civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers. This decision is contrary to the analysis
of Strate,which dismissed the notion that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
is different than regulatory jurisdiction. 8 5
In Big Horn Electric v. Adams,18 6 the Crow Tribe imposed an ad
valorem tax on utility property located on power company rights-of-way
on the Crow Reservation. 8 7 The electric company sued officials of the
Crow Tribe, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the tribal
utility tax on the company's property on a right-of-way across tribal
lands.18s
The district court determined that the right-of-way was
equivalent to fee land owned by nonmembers for purposes of deciding
nonmember governance; it also ruled that the sale of power to the Tribe
was taxable as an example of a consensual relationship. 8 9 The court
determined that the ad valorem tax on the property exceeded the Tribe's
inherent sovereignty because it was not imposed on the activity that
formed the consensual relationship, the sale of power.' 90 The court
stated that Strate and Marchington had impliedly overruled Blackfeet.191
Accordingly, the tribe lacked authority to impose an ad valorem tax on
rights-of-way deemed to be the equivalent of fee land owned by
nonmembers.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied. 505 U.S. 1212 (1992).
185. Red Wolf 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
186. 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Blackfeet; 924 F.2d 899. A railroad sought to enjoin tribes from taxing the railroad's
non-possessory interest in property within their reservations. The Ninth Circuit held that
the tribes had the inherent sovereign authority to tax the rights-of-way granted to the
railroad based upon the tribes' "continuing property interest" in the land. Id. at 904. The
grant of a limited possessory interest to the railroad did not extinguish the tribes' interest
in the land, therefore the tribes retained the authority to tax nonmembers doing business
on reservation land for the tribal benefits they enjoy. The Ninth Circuit decision in
Blackfeet was premised on the Supreme Court's decisions in Merrion. Blackfeet also
arguably involved a consensual relationship with the tribes within the meaning of Montana
Exception One.
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In summary, to analyze tribal inherent authority in the post-1978
era it is essential to distinguish between the civil jurisdiction that a tribe
may possess over nonmembers on Indian lands from the general
proposition of no jurisdiction that applies concerning activities on
rights-of-way or lands alienated to non-Indians.19 2 The consensual
relationship basis for jurisdiction, Montana Exception One, has been
found in several cases but virtually no conduct except spoiling a pristine
areaseems to pose a sufficiently serious threat to tribal interests to
support tribal court jurisdiction on the basis of Montana Exception
Two 193 Accordingly, while the Montana exceptions can provide the basis
for tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on nontribal lands in
appropriate cases, it is important to focus on the possibility of
congressional authorization for tribal action, or delegation of authority,
where it can be found.
V.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OR DELEGATION AS A BASIS FOR TRIBAL
AUTHORITY OVER NONMEMBERS

Because of the confused and increasingly narrow application for
inherent tribal sovereignty, it is important to consider available statutes
authorizing or delegating powers to Indian tribes.
United States v.
Mazurie,194 is the leading case on "delegation" to tribes of authority over
non-Indians.' 9 5 The Mazuries operated a bar on fee land within the
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. They were denied a tribal liquor
license by the tribe under its option to regulate the introduction of liquor
into Indian country. 9 6 The United States prosecuted them and obtained
a conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1154.
The Mazurie opinion focuses on the phrase in § 1154 exempting
"fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities" within Indian
reservations from the Indian liquor laws.19 7
However, for delegation
purposes the relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1161. This section is a

192. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 2001) (defining Indian Country). Virtually all of the
case law discussed here address tribal jurisdiction within Indian Country. On lands not
held in trust by the United States for a tribe or individual Indian that lye outside the
established boundaries of an Indian reservation, a different analysis applies. In Alaska v.
Native Village of Venete Tribal Govt., 522 U.S. 520 (1998), the Court held that land held by
that tribe was not Indian Country because it was not an Indian reservation, dependent
Indian community, or an Indian allotment. As a result, the tribe lacked authority to tax a
private contractor building on the property. Id.; see Blunk v. Ariz. Dept. of Trans., 177 F.3d
879 (9th Cir. 1999) (billboard on non-reservation fee land owned by Navajo Nation was
outside Indian Country so state regulatory authority was not preempted).
193. Cf. El PasoNatural Gas v. Neztsosle, 136 F.3d 610, 617 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1998); rev'd on
other grounds, 526 U.S. 473 (1999) (it seems indisputable that a claim involving uranium
contamination poses a danger to the health or welfare of the Tribe).
194. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1154 (West 2001).
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1953 congressional local-option act allowing tribes, with the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, to regulate the introduction of liquor into
Indian country (so long as state law is not violated). 198 Section 1161
exempts from federal prosecution acts "in conformity... with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of
Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior, and published
in the federal register." 199 However, note that this statute does not
directly delegate authority to any tribe nor expressly approve any
particular tribe's ordinance. It does make clear that tribal liquor
ordinances, duly adopted, certified by the Interior, and published in the
Federal Register will have legal effect for federal criminal law purposes. °0
The court of appeals in Mazurie expressed doubt that Congress has
power to regulate businesses on non-Indian fee land.2 ° ' Part III of the
Supreme Court's opinion dismissed that doubt on the basis of the Indian
Commerce Clause, and the string of cases involving sale of alcoholic
beverages to tribal Indians whether on or off a reservation.2 °2
In Part IV of its opinion the Court held that Congress has the power
to delegate its authority to tribes. 2°3 The Court noted cases limiting the
authority of Congress to delegate its legislative power, discussed below,
but upheld the delegation in § 1161 as follows:
[When Congress, delegated its authority to control the introduction of
alcoholic beverages into Indian country, it did so to entities which possess
a certain degree of independent authority over matters that affect the
internal and social relations of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use

of intoxicants is just such a matter. We need not decide whether this
independent authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to impose Ordinance
No. 26. It is necessary only to state that the independent tribal authority
is quite sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal councils
this portion of its own authority 'to regulate Commerce... with the Indian
tribes.'2 °4 The fact that the Mazuries could not become members of the
tribe, and therefore could
not participate in the tribal government, does
2 5
not alter our conclusion.

0

Mazurie is a landmark case upholding the authority of Congress to
authorize tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians when the
jurisdiction concerns matters "affecting the internal and social relations
of tribal life." 20 6 It does not impose a requirement that a tribe possess

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See 18 U.S.CA. § 1161 (West 2001).

Id.
Id.
Mazur4 419 U.S. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 557 (citing U.S. v. Curttss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
Id.
Id.
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inherent sovereignty over a subject in order to support congressional
delegation; to the contrary, as the interpretation of the Montana
exceptions have shown, the tests for inherent sovereignty20 7 are much
narrower than Congress' ability to authorize tribal authority.

Montana construed both the Crow treaties and 18 U.S.C. § 1165 as
possible sources for the Tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunting
and fishing on non-Indian lands within the Reservation. °8 The Ninth
Circuit had held that the federal trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165,
"augmented" the Tribe's regulatory power over non-Indian land. 0 9
However, the Supreme Court held:
If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by
non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in § 1165 the
definition of "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C. § 1151....
Indeed, a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary proposed that
this be done. But the Department of the Interior recommended against
doing so .... "o
Note that the Montana Court's example of § 1165 demonstrates the
difference between the showing required to satisfy the two Montana
exceptions for inherent sovereignty and the "certain degree of
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social
relations of tribal life," which Mazurie indicates will support a
congressional delegation of jurisdiction to a tribe. 2 11 The Montana Court
rejected the tribe's contention that it had inherent sovereign authority
over non-Indian hunting and fishing but also indicated that Congress
could have delegated that authority by amending § 1165.212
Brendale, also discussed above, is important not only for its
discussion of Montana Exceptions One and Two but also for its
explanation of situations in which Congress has delegated authority to
tribes.2 13 Mr. Justice White commented that Brendale involved "no
contention... that Congress has expressly delegated to the214Yakima
Nation the power to zone fee lands of nonmembers of the Tribe."
Justice White cited four examples of express statutory delegation.

207. City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux, 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2741 (1994) (The court relied on § 1161, as construed in Rice v. Rehner,
463 U.S. 713 (1983), as authority for tribal regulation of liquor throughout the reservation

with no exemption for non-Indian communities. Thus, while the reference to non-Indian
communities at issue in Mazurie would affect federal criminal prosecutions, it would not
limit the tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers authorized by § 1161.).
208. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
209. U.S. v. Mont., 604 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1979).
210. Mont., 450 U.S. at 562.
211. Mazuri 419 U.S. at 557.
212. Mont., 450 U.S. at 562.
213. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).

214. Id. at 428.
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The first citation refers to the definition of Indian country,2 5 and the
second, the authorization of tribal local option ordinances that were at
issue in United States v. Mazure.2 16 The third and fourth citations are
particularly important as they refer to § 518 of the Clean Water Act,
which, like several federal environmental laws, clearly anticipates tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Justice White's fourth citation, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(h)(1), defines "federal Indian reservation" in exactly the way
Indian country is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Le., all reservation land,
notwithstanding patents and rights of way. The third statute cited,
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e), indicates a process by which tribes can exercise a
series of important powers under the Clean Water Act if they satisfy the
EPA Administrator that they meet certain conditions.
The Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA Administrator to treat an
Indian tribe as a state if it has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers, proposes to manage water resources
within an Indian reservation, and is found by the Administrator to be
capable of carrying out water resource functions in a manner consistent
with the Clean Water Act and its regulations. Under § 518, tribes may
exercise the same authority as states for several purposes, including
setting water quality standards and issuing certification of compliance
with standards, water discharge permits, and wetlands permits. Section
518 does not expressly grant any power or approve any particular tribe's
ordinance.
Instead it sets up a process under which the EPA
Administrator can approve tribal enactments that thereby become
enforceable against members and nonmembers alike.
Unfortunately, the EPA has taken a narrow view of § 518 in
regulations, essentially limiting its applicability to situations in which
the tribal government can show it possesses inherent sovereign
authority under Montana exceptions One and Two.217 In Montana v. U.S.
EPA, the Agency's decision to grant "treatment as a state" status to the
Confederated Salish and Kootenal Tribes was upheld. 218 The State of
Montana used the EPA's requirement that a tribe show its inherent
authority as an opening to re-determine the scope of inherent
authority. 2 9 However, the Ninth Circuit upheld the regulation, noting
that EPA had taken a cautious view of § 518 and Montana Exception
Two and finding that the regulation reflected "appropriate delineation
and application of inherent Tribal regulatory authority over
non-consenting nonmembers." 220 The district court would have found

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 2001).
See 18 U.S.CA. § 1161 (West 2001).
See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966, 67,970-71 (Dec. 22, 1993).
Mont. v. EPA, 137 F. 3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1139-40.
Id.at 1141.
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§ 518 by itself to be an ample delegation of federal authority. 22'
Arizona Public Service Co. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,
is a
22 3
major case on delegated authority.
This case concerns the power of
tribes to implement air quality regulations under the 1990 amendments
224
to the Clean Air Act.
Petitioners challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency's regulations, promulgated in 1998, implementing the
Amendments.2 25
The Clean Air Act amendments refer to tribal jurisdiction in several
places. In section 7410(o) Tribal Implementation Plans may become
applicable to all areas "located within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent and including
rights-of-way running through the reservation."226 However, in section
7601(d)(1)(B) tribes may be treated as States "within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's
jurisdiction. " 2 27 The Court of Appeals held that Congress delegated
authority to tribes to regulate all lands within reservations, but Judge
Ginsberg dissented from that holding, contending that Congress
delegated authority only with respect to tribal implementation plans
because in the other provision Congress failed to "include the formulaic
'notwithstanding' proviso [that is] the gold standard for such

delegations.

228

Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe,229 upheld a tribal ordinance barring
logging in a sacred zone within the boundaries of the Hoopa Valley
Reservation in California. In 1994, as part of the Hoopa Valley Tribe's
ten-year forest management plan, the tribe notified land owners in the
Bald Hill portion of the reservation of the proposed establishment of a
half-mile no-cut buffer zone around a sacred dance trail and sites.m°
Written notice of the proposed buffer zone was sent to the owners of the
land that was later purchased in fee by Roberta Bugenig, a nonmember
of the tribe. In 1995, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council officially approved
the buffer zone. The Bureau of Indian Affairs approved establishment of

221. Mont v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996). See generally Alex Tallchief
Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian Law and the Agencies' Duty to Interpret
Legislation in Favor of Indians:Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the "TribesAs
States" Section of the Clean Water Act?, 11 St. Thomas L. Rev. 15 (1998); Raymond Cross,
When Brendale Met Chevron: The Role of Federal Courts in the Construction of An Indian
EnvironmentalLaw, 1 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 1 (1996).
222. 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1600 (2001).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.; see Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254
(Feb. 12, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 9, 35, 49, 50 and 81).
226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(o) (West 2001).
227. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7601(d)(1)(B) (West 2001).
228. Ariz. Public Service Co., 211 F.3d at 1302-03.
229. No.C 98-3409 CW (W.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1999), affd, 266 F.3d 1201 (9thCir. 2001).
230. Id.
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the buffer zone.231
After establishment of the buffer zone, Roberta Bugenig purchased
forty acres within the zone and prepared to log the timber on her
property. She contacted the Humboldt County Planning Department
and the California Department of Forestry asserting that she was exempt
from state timber harvesting plan requirements because her proposed
logging involved less than three acres. However, she entered into a log
sale agreement to harvest all the timber on her property. Bugenig also
met with the Tribal Council to request a permit to haul her logs over
tribal roads, which the Tribal Council denied. Bugenig proceeded to log
within the buffer zone. 2
The Hoopa Valley Tribe sued Bugenig in tribal court seeking
injunctive relief and damages.
The court granted a temporary
restraining order and ultimately issued final judgment upholding the
tribe's authority.2 3 3 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Bugenig, Bugenig appealed to
the Northwest Regional Tribal Supreme Court, the final appellate court
for the Hoopa Valley Tribe. The Pacific Legal Foundation represented
Bugenig.2
The tribal supreme court affirmed the tribal trial court's conclusion
that the tribe lawfully exercised jurisdiction over Bugenig's logging
activities. The tribal supreme court's jurisdiction was supported by a
provision of the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act. 5 The court concluded
that because logging posed such a significant threat to the White
Deerskin Dance sites and trail, Montana Exception Two supported the
tribe's inherent jurisdiction over Bugenig's timber cutting activities. "36
Having exhausted tribal court remedies, Bugenig filed suit in federal
district court seeking declaratory judgment that the tribe lacks
regulatory jurisdiction over her land and that the tribal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over it as well. 23 7 The district court granted
the tribe's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Congress expressly
granted the tribe jurisdiction over al lands within the reservation's
boundaries, including Bugenig's land, through a section of the
Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act of 1988.238 The statute provides existing
governing documents of the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the governing body
established and elected thereunder, as heretofore recognized by the
Secretary, are hereby ratified and confirmed.2 39

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Bugenig, 266 F.3d at 1208.
Id.
See 25 I.L.R. 6137 (Hoopa Valley Tr. Ct. July 11, 1996).
Id. at 6144; Bugenig, 266 F.3d at 1204.
25 U.S.C.A. § 1300i-7 (West 2001).
Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 25 I.L.R. 6139 (Hoopa Valley S. Ct. 1998).
Bugenig, 266 F.3d at 1209.
See 25 U.S.C.A. §1300i-7 (West 2001).
Id.
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The "governing documents" referred to include the Tribal
Constitution, which declares that the jurisdiction of the Hoopa Valley
Tribe extends to all lands within the reservation boundaries and also
gives the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council specific authority to:
[R]egulat[e] the conduct of trade and the use and disposition of property
upon the reservation, provided that any ordinance directly affecting
non-members of the Hoopa Valley Tribe shall be subject to the approval of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs or his authorized representative. 2 4 0
Like Morrts, the statute in Bugenig expressly authorizes a tribal
ordinance applying to nonmembers, but does so with the precaution that
the Secretary of Interior's approval is also required.2 41
The district court noted that correct construction of the
Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act is a question of law.242
It found no
authority supporting Bugenig's contention that the phrase "ratified and
confirmed" is ambiguous:
The Court concludes that the plain meaning of 'ratified and confirmed' is
to give every clause in the document being ratified the full force and effect
of a congressional statute. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act
evinces a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary....
Accordingly, the Court holds that § 1300i-7 of the Act unambiguously
grants each clause of the Tribal Constitution the full force and effect of a
congressional statute.2 43
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the district court's decision on October 3, 2000.2 4 Judge
O'Scannlain wrote on behalf of himself and Judges Reavley and Gould,
holding that because of a presumption against tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers on fee lands, any congressional delegation must be truly
245
express.
If Congress uses the "notwithstanding" proviso then an
appropriate delegation has been made. Any alternative formulation
must, on its face, represent a pellucid delegation of the claimed
authority.246
The panel opinion went on to address an issue not
considered by the district court, that is, whether the Hoopa Valley Tribe
possessed inherent tribal authority to exercise civil jurisdiction under
the circumstances. 2A 7
The court found that the second Montana
exception must be narrowly construed and allows tribal jurisdiction over

240. Hoopa Valley Tribe Const. art. IX, § 1(1) (approved as amended June 18, 1996).
241. Id.
242. Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. C 98-3409 CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1999)
(avaliable at <http://www.msaj.com/cases/bugenig.htm.>).
243. Id. at 8.
244. Bugenig, 229 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g en banc granted, 240 F.3d 1215
(2001).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss2/7

28

Schlosser: Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
20011

TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS

601

nonmembers only when necessary to protect self-government or control
internal relations.m In a footnote, the court rejected the tribe's claim
that Brendale supported tribal land use authority because the area at
issue in Bugenig is dominated by tribal land ownership and the tribe
maintains the right to determine the essential character of the area. 2 9
On February 28, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
an en banc rehearing and prohibited further citation of the panel opinion
within the Ninth Circuit pending the results of rehearing. On rehearing
the court affirmed the district court by a vote of 8-3. The court
concluded that under the circumstances Congress had expressly
delegated authority for the ordinance.
VI.

OTHER STATUTES CONFIRM TRIBALAUTHORrIY

Title 25 of the United States Code contains many examples of
congressional authorization for the exercise of tribal authority over
nonmembers. An example is found in the Indian Child Welfare Act.2 5 °
Section 1903(4) certainly applies to nonmembers because it includes in
the definition of Indian child an unmarried juvenile who is "eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member. " 25' The statute was upheld in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
252
Indians v. Holyfie1cL
An even broader authorization is found in the Indian
Self-Determination Act, 2593 under which tribes by contract or compact
carry out functions and activities that would otherwise be performed by
federal officials. As a result, under statutes such as the Indian Law
Enforcement Reform Act, 2 54 BIA employees (and hence tribal employees
under Pub. L. 93-638) may "make an arrest without a warrant for an
offense committed in Indian country" under certain conditions. 255 Thus
perhaps the need to use federal authorization or delegation of authority
over nonmembers is yet another reason for tribes to enter into broadly
framed self-governance compacts under which the tribe may exercise all
delegable authorities of the Interior Department and the Department of
Health and Human Services.
Elsewhere in the United States Code, Congress has authorized the
exercise of the tribal authority over nonmembers. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 1161, discussed above, authorizes tribal regulation of liquor. A

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
25 U.S.C-.A §1901 et seq. (West 2001).
25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4) (West 2001).
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfk/, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
Pub. L. No. 93-638 (Dec. 19, 1974).
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2809 (West 2001).
25 U.S.C.A § 2803(3) (West 2001).
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section of the Violence Against Women Act256 makes tribal court
protection orders enforceable elsewhere as a matter of full faith and
credit.
In addition to the Clean Water Act, discussed above in
connection with Brendale and Montana v. U.S. EPA, a number of federal
statutes protecting and regulating environmental matters provide for the
exercise of tribal authority under the Treatment as a State process or
something similar. For example, tribes have substantial authority under
the Clean Air Act.25 7 Also, about fifty provisions in the United States
Code call for consultation with Indian tribes and in several cases provide
substantial tribal authority or procedural protection for tribal
258
interests.
Congressional statutes that reflect an intention to ratify,
confirm, reaffirm, or otherwise enable the exercise of tribal territorial
jurisdiction, or other specific authorities, already exist. The Supreme
Court has not suggested that the "express delegation" standard will be
rigidly applied.
Reliance on congressional authorization for tribal
exercises of authority may reverse or slow the erosion of the inherent
tribal sovereignty doctrine in the federal courts.

256. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (West 2001).
257. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et seq. (West 2001); see generally Wash. DepL of Ecology v. EPA,
752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985); Ariz. v.EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended,
170 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999); see EPA, American Indian Environmental Office Materials
<http://www.epa.gov/indian/matrix.htm> (last accessed Oct. 12, 2001).
258. See generally Exec. Or. 130384, 25 C.F.R. 1000.4 (2001). The National Historic
Preservation Act and the Archeological Resources Protection Act authorize substantial
tribal authority. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a et seq. (West 2001); 16 U.S.C.A. § 470ii et seq.
(West 2001).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss2/7

30

